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I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, with the development of various integrated sen-
sors and crowd sensing systems, the crowdsourced information
from all aspects can be collected and analyzed among various
data attributes to better produce rich knowledge about the
group [19], [47], thus benefiting everyone in the crowdsourced
system [24]. Particularly, with high-dimensional crowdsourced
data (data with multiple attributes), a lot of potential informa-
tion and rules behind the data can be mined or extracted to pro-
vide accurate dynamics and reliable prediction for both group
and individuals [27]. For example, both individual electricity
usage and community-wide electricity usage should be cap-
tured to achieve the real-time community-aware pricing in the
smart grid, which integrates the distributed energy generation
as well as consumption [29], [36]. People’s historical medical
records and genetic information [4], [32] can be collected
and mined to help hospital staff better diagnose and monitor
patients’ health status. Various environment monitoring data
collected from smart phone users can make urban planning
more efficient and people’s daily life more convenient [23].
However, the privacy of participants can be easily inferred
or identified due to the publication of crowdsourced data [17],
[33], [43], especially high-dimensional data, even though some
existing privacy-preserving schemes are used. The reasons for
the privacy leak are two-fold:
• Non-local Privacy. Most existing work for privacy pro-
tection focus on centralized datasets under the assumption
that the server is trustable. However, in crowdsourced
scenarios, direct data aggregation from distributed users
can give adversaries (such as curious server and mis-
behaved insiders) the opportunity to identify individual
privacy, even if end-to-end encryption is used. Despite the
privacy protection against difference and inference attacks
from aggregate queries, individual’s data may still suffer
from privacy leakage before aggregation because of no
guaranteed privacy on the user side (i.e., local privacy [6],
[9], [20], [21]).
• Curse of High-dimensionality. In crowdsourced systems,
high-dimensional data is ubiquitous. With the increase of
data dimension, some existing privacy-preserving tech-
niques like differential privacy [10] (a de-facto stan-
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dard privacy paradigm), if straightforwardly applied to
multiple attributes with high correlations, will become
vulnerable, thereby increasing the success ratio of many
reference attacks like cross-checking. According to the
combination theorem [31], differential privacy degrades
exponentially when multiple correlated queries are pro-
cessed. From the aspect of utility, baseline differential
privacy algorithms can hardly achieve reasonable scala-
bility and desirable data accuracy due to the dimensional
correlations [48].
In addition to the privacy vulnerability, a large scale of vari-
ous data records collected from distributed users can imply the
inefficiency of data processing. Especially in IoT applications,
the ubiquitous but resource-constrained sensors and infras-
tructures require extremely high efficiency and low overhead.
For example, privacy-preserving real-time pricing mechanism
requires not only effective privacy guarantee for individu-
als’ electricity usages but also fast response to the dynamic
changes of the demands and supplies in the smart grid [29].
Thus, it is important to provide an efficient privacy-preserving
method to publish the crowdsourced high-dimensional data.
In addressing the above issues, various existing schemes
demonstrated their effectiveness in terms of different perspec-
tives. One is to provide local privacy for distributed users [14],
while some recent work [40] [16] have been proposed to
provide a local privacy guarantee for individuals in data
aggregations. However, these schemes are either inefficient or
not applicable for high-dimensional data [46] because of the
high computation complexity and great utility loss. The other
is to privately release high dimensional data [8] [46] [7]. For
example, Chen et al. [7] proposed to achieve differential pri-
vacy on compacted attribute clusters after dimension reduction
according to the attribute correlations. However, these schemes
mainly deal with the centralized dataset without local privacy
guarantee for distributed data contributors. To overcome the
compatibility problem between those schemes, we propose a
novel scheme to publish high-dimensional crowdsourced data
while guaranteeing local privacy.
A. Contribution
Our major contributions are summarized as follows.
• In this paper, we propose a locally privacy-preserving
scheme for crowdsensing systems to collect and build
high dimensional data from the distributed users. Partic-
ularly, we propose an efficient algorithm for multivariate
joint distribution estimation and a combined algorithm
to improve the existing estimation algorithms in order to
achieve both high efficiency and accuracy.
• Based on the distribution and correlation information, the
dimensionality and sparsity in the original dataset can
be reduced by splitting the dataset into many compacted
clusters.
• After learning the marginal distribution in these com-
pacted clusters, the server can draw a new dataset from
these compacted clusters, thus achieving an approxima-
tion of the whole original crowd data while guaranteeing
local privacy for individuals.
• We implement and evaluate our schemes on different real-
world datasets, experimental results show that our scheme
is both efficient and effective in marginal estimation as
well as high-dimensional data releasing.
B. Organization
The paper is organized as follows: In Section III, we
introduce the system model in our paper. In Section IV,
we present preliminaries of our approach. Then, Section V
presents our proposed schemes in detail. In Section VI, we
present the experiment results to validate the efficiency and
effectiveness of our schemes. Last, we concludes this paper in
Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
A. High-dimensional data
To solve the privacy issue in data releasing, differential
privacy [10] was proposed to lay a mathematical privacy
foundation by adding proper randomness. Examples of the use
of differential privacy include the privacy-preserving data ag-
gregation operations, where differential privacy of individuals
can be guaranteed by injecting carefully-calibrated Laplacian
noise [7], [15], [22], [26], [37], [45], [46]. The techniques
for non-interactive differential privacy [11], [12] suffer from
”curse of dimensionality” [7], [46]. Particularly, the combina-
tion theorems [31] have pointed out that differential privacy
degrades when multiple related queries are processed [35]. To
deal with the correlations in high-dimensional data, different
schemes have been proposed [7], [8], [22], [30], [42], [46],
[48].
For example, Liu et al. [30] proposed the notion of de-
pendent differential privacy (DDP) and dependent perturba-
tion mechanism (DPM) to both measure and preserve the
privacy with consideration of the dependence and correlations.
Another solution to mitigate correlation problem is to group
the correlated records into clusters and then achieve privacy
on each low-dimensional cluster. Based on the data structure
of dimensions, these solutions can be categorized into two
classes: homogeneous and heterogeneous.
1) Homogeneous data means the data structure of all
dimensions is the same. For example, in the massive
text document, each dimension represents the frequency
histogram of a text on the distinct words. Since the
data structure is the same, basic distance metrics can
be simply used to cluster the similar dimensions. For
example, Kellaris et al. [22] proposed to group the data
attributes with similar sensitivities together to reduce the
overall sensitivity. Based on the similar idea, Wang et
al. [42] proposed to group the data streams with the
similar trend to achieve efficient privacy on data streams.
However, both value and trend similarities cannot truly
reflect the correlations in heterogeneous data.
2) Heterogeneous data refers to the high-dimensional data
with different dimensions, i.e., different attribute do-
mains. For example, personal profiles may include vari-
ous attributes like gender, age, education status. Intuitive
distance metrics cannot measure the correlations among
heterogeneous. Therefore, Zhang et al. [46] proposed to
calculate the mutual information of attribute-parent pairs
and then model the correlations via a Bayesian network.
Li et al. [25] proposed to use copula functions to model
joint distribution for high-dimensional data. However,
Copula functions cannot handle attributes with small
domains, which limits its application. Chen et al. [7]
proposed to directly calculate the mutual information
between pairwise dimensions and build a dependency
graph and junction tree to model the correlations.
However, in existing schemes [7], [46] as depicted by
Figure 1, the original dataset are plainly accessed twice
to learn the correlations among attributes and generate the
distributions for clusters. Although calibrated noises are added
separately (the 4th and 7th step) on the aggregation results,
individual’s privacy can only be protected against the third
parties from the aggregation but still be threatened by the
server, who collects and aggregates the data. In addition, the
two accesses are computed separately without a consistent
privacy guarantee. That is, two differential privacy budgets
were allocated separately but it is not clear about how to
allocate the privacy budget to achieve both sufficient privacy
guarantee and utility maximization. Besides, although the
entire high dimensional data can be reduced into several low-
dimensional clusters. The sparsity caused by combinations
in each cluster still exists and may lead to lower utility.
In contrast to the totally centralized setting in [7], Su et
al. [39] proposed a distributed multi-party setting to publish
new dataset from multiple data curators. However, their multi-
party computation can only protect the privacy between data
servers. Instead, individual’s local privacy in a data server
cannot be guaranteed.
Also, for high-dimensional data, to show the crowd statistics
and draw the correlations between attributes (variables), both
privacy-preserving histogram (univariate distribution) [3] and
contingency table1 (multivariate joint distribution) [34] are
widely investigated. However, these work can not provide local
privacy guarantee, thus being unable to apply to crowdsourced
systems.
B. Local privacy
However, the schemes mentioned above mainly deal with
the centralized dataset. There could be scenarios, where dis-
tributed users contribute to the aggregate statistics. Despite
the privacy protection against difference and inference attacks
from aggregate queries, individual’s data may also suffer from
privacy leakage before aggregation. Hence, the notion of local
privacy has been proposed to provide local privacy guarantee
for distributed users. In addition, local privacy from the end
1A contingency table is a visualised table widely used in statistic areas that
displays multivariate joint distribution of attributes.
user can ensure the consistency of the privacy guarantee when
there are multiple access to users’ data. Instead, non-local
privacy schemes like [46] and [7] have to split and assign
proper privacy budgets to different steps while accessing to
the original data.
Local privacy schemes mainly focus on achieving differen-
tially private noise via combining the data from distributed
source. Many different distributed differential privacy tech-
niques were proposed [13]. However, the local noise may be
too small to cover the original data. Recently, local privacy
aims to learn particular aggregation features from distributed
users with some public knowledge [14], [16], [17], [40]. Sun
et al. [40] proposed a percentile aggregation scheme for mon-
itoring distributed stream. In this scheme, the possible range
information is public known. For example, Groatet al. [17]
proposed the technique negative surveys, which is based on
randomized response techniques [18], [44], to identify the
true distributions from noisy participants’ data. Similarly,
Erlingsson et al. [14] proposed RAPPOR to estimate the
frequencies of different strings in a candidate set. Their subse-
quent research [16] proposed to learn the correlations between
dimensions via EM based learning algorithm. However, when
the dimension is high, sparsity of data will lead to great
utility loss, and moreover, the EM algorithm will have a
exponentially higher complexity.
Different from these work, we propose a novel mechanism
to publish high-dimensional crowdsourced data with local
privacy for individuals. We compare our work with three
similar existing work in the Table I. In terms of privacy model,
our method is local privacy while JTree [7] is not. Our method
supports high dimensional data better than RAPPOR [14] and
EM [16]. Also, our method has relatively lower communica-
tion cost, time and storage complexity2.
TABLE I: Comparison of LoPub with existing methods
Comparison LoPub (Our method) RAPPOR [14] EM [16] JTree [7]
Local privacy Y Y Y N
High Dimension Y N N Y
Communication O(
∑
j |Ωj |) O(
∏
j |Ωj |) O(
∑
j |Ωj|) -
Time Complexity Low Low Large -
Space Complexity Low Large Large -
III. SYSTEM MODEL
The system model is depicted in Figure 2, where a lot of
users and a central server are interconnected, constituting a
crowdsourcing system. The users first collect high-dimensional
data records from multiple attributes at the same time, and
then send these data to the central server. The server gathers
all the data and estimates high-dimensional crowdsourced data
distribution with local privacy, aiming to release a privacy-
preserving dataset to third-parties for conducting data analysis.
In this paper, we mainly focus on data privacy, thus the detailed
network model is not emphasised.
Problem Statement. Given a collection of data records
with d attributes from different users, our goal is to help
the central server publish a synthetic dataset that has the
approximate joint distribution of d attributes with local privacy.
Formally, let N be the total number of users (i.e., data
2Detailed analysis of time and storage complexity can be referred to
Section V-C
records3) and sufficiently large. Let X = {X1, X2, . . . , XN}
be the crowdsourced dataset, whereX i denotes the data record
from the ith user. We assume that there are d attributes
A = {A1, A2, . . . , Ad} in X . Then each data record X
i can
be represented as X i = {xi1, x
i
2, . . . , x
i
d}, where x
i
j denotes
the jth element of the ith user record. For each attribute
Aj (j = 1, 2, . . . , d), we denote Ωj = {ω
1
j , ω
2
j , . . . , ω
|Ωj |
j }
as the domain of Aj , where ω
i
j is the ith attribute value of Ωj
and |Ωj | is the cardinality of Ωj .
With the above notations, our problem can be formulated
as follows: Given a dataset X , we aim to release a locally
privacy-preserving dataset X⋆ with the same attributes A and
number N of users in X such that
PX⋆(A1 . . . Ad) ≈ PX(A1 . . . Ad) (1)
and
PX(A1 . . . Ad) , PX(x
i
1 = ω1, . . . , x
i
d = ωd) (2)
for i = 1, . . . , N, and ω1, . . . , ωd ∈ Ωd
where PX(x
i
1 = ω1, . . . , x
i
d = ωd) is defined as the d-
dimensional (multivariate) joint distribution on X .
To focus our research on data privacy, we assume that the
central server and users are all honest-but-curious in the sense
that they will honestly follow the protocols in the system
without maliciously manipulating their received data. How-
ever, they may be curious about others’ data privacy and even
collide to infer others’ data. In addition, the central server and
users share the same public information, such as the privacy-
preserving protocols (including the hash functions used) and
the domain Ωj for each attribute Aj (j = 1, 2, . . . , d).
IV. PRELIMINARIES
A. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is the de-facto standard for privacy
guarantee on . It limits the adversaries’ ability of inferring the
participation or absence of any user in a data set via adding
carefully calibrated noise to the query results on the data set.
The definition of ǫ-differential privacy can be found in [10].
ǫ is the privacy budget (or privacy parameter) to specify the
level of privacy protection and smaller ǫ means better privacy.
According to the combination theorem [35], extra privacy
budget will be required when multiple differential privacy
mechanisms are applied on related queries. Once ǫ is run out,
no more differential privacy can be guaranteed.
If a mechanismM is ǫ-differential privacy on dataset D and
a new dataset D′ sampled from D with uniformly sampling
rate β. Then, queryingM on D′ can guarantee a ln(1+β(eǫ−
1))−differential privacy for dataset D [28].
B. Local Differential Privacy
Generally, differential privacy focuses on centralized
database and implicitly assumes data aggregation is trustwor-
thy. Aiming to eliminate this assumption, local privacy was
proposed for crowdsourced systems to provide a stringent
privacy guarantee that data contributors trust no one [9], [21].
A formal definition of local differential privacy is given below.
3For brevity, we assume that each user sends only one data record to the
central server.
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Fig. 1: Main procedures of high-dimensional data publishing without local privacy
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Fig. 2: An architecture of distributed high dimensional private
data collecting and publishing
Definition 1: For any user i, a mechanism M satisfies ǫ-
local differential privacy (or simply local privacy) if for any
two data records X i, Y i ∈ Ω1×· · ·×Ωd, and for any possible
privacy-preserving outputs X˜ i ∈ Range(M),
P
(
M(X i) = X˜ i
)
≤ eǫ · P
(
M(Y i) = X˜ i
)
, (3)
where the probability is taken over M′s randomness and ǫ
has similar impact on privacy as in the ordinary differential
privacy.
Local privacy has many applications. A typical example is
the randomized response technique [44], which is widely used
in the survey of people’s “yes or no” opinions about a private
issue. Participants of the survey are required to give their true
answers with a certain probability or random answers with the
remaining probability. Due to the randomness, the surveyor
cannot determine the true answers of participants individually
(i.e., local privacy is guaranteed) while can predict the true
proportions of alternative answers.
C. RAPPOR based Local Privacy
Recently, RAPPOR (Randomized Aggregatable Privacy-
Preserving Ordinal Response) has been proposed for statistics
aggregation [14]. RAPPOR is only applicable to one or two
dimensional crowdsourced data for estimating data distribution
with local privacy. The basic idea of RAPPOR is the extension
of the randomized response technique. In the randomized
response technique, the candidate set of the domain Ω is only
a binary input {0, 1} denoting “yes or no”, whereas RAPPOR
generalizes the candidate set of Ω to multiple inputs such that a
sufficiently long {0, 1} bit string can be applied to the domain
Ω.
On users, RAPPOR consists of two phases:
1) Feature Assignment. In this phase, the dataset X
has only one attribute with the domain Ω. For each
candidate value ω ∈ Ω, several hash functions are used
to transform ω into a m-bit {0, 1} string S (a.k.a. a
Bloom filter). Once m and the number of hash functions
are well chosen, this transformation can maximize the
uniqueness of a bit string S to represent any attribute
value ω ∈ Ω.As suggested by [38], m is proportional
to the domain size |Ω|, i.e., m ∝ |Ω|.
2) Feature Cloaking. After the Bloom filter S is obtained,
each bit in S will be randomized to 0 or 1 with a certain
probability, or remains unchanged with the remaining
probability. This randomness is important as it endows
the privacy on the original data. The more randomness,
the better privacy.
On the central server, RAPPOR first gathers randomized
Bloom filters from different users, and then estimates the
univariate distribution as follows:
1) Aggregation. Once gathered by the central server, all
the bit strings will be summed up bitwise. Then the
true count of each bit can be estimated based on the
randomness of the bit strings.
2) Feature Rebuilding. The hash functions used on the
user side are replayed on the server side to reconstruct
the Bloom filters for each ω ∈ Ω.
3) Distribution Estimation. Taking the Bloom filters as the
feature variables, the server can estimate the univariate
distribution of the single attribute via linear regression.
It is important to note that RAPPOR is only efficient in low
dimensional data because when the dimension k is high, the
length mRAPPOR of Bloom filters over the multi-attribute
domain Ω1 × Ω2 × · · · × Ωk will become
mRAPPOR ∝ |Ω1 × Ω2 × · · · × Ωk| =
k∏
j=1
|Ωj |, (4)
TABLE II: Notation
N number of users (data records) in the system
X entire crowdsourced dataset on the server side
Xi data record from the ith user
xij jth element of X
i
d number of attributes in X
R set of all attribute clusters
Aj : jth attribute of X
Ωj domain of Aj
ωj candidate attribute value in Ωj
Hj(x) hash functions for Aj that map x into a Bloom filter
sij Bloom filter of x
i
j (S
i
j = Hj(x
i
j))
sij [b] bth bit of s
i
j
sˆij randomized Bloom filter of s
i
j
sˆij [b] bth bit of sˆ
i
j
mj length of s
i
j
f probability of randomly flipping a bit of a Bloom filter
which requires exponential storage space in terms of k.
To address this problem, Fanti et al. [16] proposed an
EM (Expectation Maximization) based association learning
scheme, which extends the 1-dimensional RAPPOR to es-
timate the 2-dimensional joint distribution. First, a bivari-
ate joint distribution is initialized uniformly. Then, for each
record, the conditional probability distribution of the true 2-
dimensional Bloom filters given the observed noisy record
is calculated according to the Bayes’ theorem. Finally, the
bivariate joint distribution is updated as the expectation of
the conditional probability distributions over all records. By
iterating the above steps several rounds, an estimation of the
bivariate joint distribution can be obtained. However, repeat-
ing scanning all the collected RAPPOR strings in each
round of EM algorithm incurs considerable computational
complexity.
Some notations used in this paper are listed in Table II.
V. LOPUB: HIGH-DIMENSIONAL DATA PUBLICATION WITH
LOCAL PRIVACY
We propose LoPub, a novel solution to achieve high-
dimensional crowdsourced data publication with local privacy.
In this section, we first introduce the basic idea behind LoPub
and then elaborate the algorithmic procedures in more details.
A. Basic idea
Privacy-preserving high-dimensional crowdsourced data
publication aims at releasing an approximate dataset with sim-
ilar statistical information (i.e., statistical distribution defined
in Equation (1)) while guaranteeing the local privacy. This
problem can be considered in four aspects:
First, to achieve local privacy, some local transformation
should be designed on the user side to cloak individuals’
original data record. Then, the central server needs to obtain
the statistical information, a.k.a, the distribution of original
data. There are two plausible solutions. One is to obtain
the 1-dimensional distribution on each attribute independently.
Unfortunately, the lack of consideration of correlations be-
tween dimensions will lose the utility of original dataset.
Another is to consider all attributes as one and compute the d-
dimensional joint distribution. However, due to combinations,
the possible domain will increase exponentially with the
number of dimensions, thus leading to both low scalability and
the signal-noise-ratio problems [46]. Particularly, with fixed
local privacy guarantee, the statistical accuracy of distribution
estimation will degrade significantly with the increase of the
possible domain and dimensionality. Therefore, next crucial
problem is to find a solution for reducing the dimensionality
while keeping the necessary correlations. Finally, with the
statistical distribution information on low-dimensional data,
how to synthesize a new dataset is the remaining problem.
To this end, we present LoPub, a locally privacy-preserving
data publication scheme for high-dimensional crowdsourced
data. Figure 3 shows the overview of LoPub, which mainly
consists of four mechanisms: local privacy protection, multi-
dimensional distribution estimation, dimensionality reduction,
and data synthesizing.
1) Local Privacy Protection. We first propose the local
transformation process that adopts randomized response
technique to cloak the original multi-dimensional data
records on distributed users to provide local privacy for
all individuals in the crowdsourced systems. Particularly,
we locally transform each attribute value to a random bit
string. Then, the locally privacy-preserved data is sent
to and aggregated at the central server.
2) Multi-dimensional Distribution Estimation. We then
propose multi-dimensional joint distribution estimation
schemes to obtain both the joint and marginal probability
distribution on multi-dimensional data. Inspired by [16],
we present an EM-based approach for high-dimensional
estimation. Moreover, we present Lasso-based approach
for fast estimation at the cost of slight accuracy degra-
dation. Finally, we propose a hybrid approach striking
the balance between the accuracy and efficiency.
3) Dimensionality Reduction. Based on the multi-
dimensional distribution information, we then propose
to reduce the dimensionality by identifying mutual-
correlated attributes among all dimensions and split the
high-dimensional attributes into several compact low-
dimensional attribute clusters. In this paper, considering
the heterogeneous attributes, we adopt mutual infor-
mation and undirected dependency graph to measure
and model the correlations of attributes, respectively. In
addition, we also propose a heuristic pruning scheme to
further boost the process of correlation identification.
4) Synthesizing New Dataset. Finally, we propose to sam-
ple each low-dimensional dataset according to the esti-
mated joint or conditional distribution on each attribute
cluster, thus synthesizing a new privacy-preserving
dataset.
B. Local Transformation
1) Design Rationale: A common framework of locally pri-
vate distribution estimation is that each individual user applies
a local transformation on the data for privacy protection and
then sends the transformed data to the server. The server
estimates the joint distribution according to the transformed
data. Local transformation in our design includes two key
steps: one is mapping into Bloom filters and the other is
adding randomness. Particularly, Bloom filter over Ω with
multiple hash functions can hash all the variables in the
domain into a pre-defined space. Thus, the unique bit strings
are the representative features of the original report. Then, after
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Fig. 3: An overview of LoPub
privacy protection by randomized responses, a large number
of samples with various levels of noise are generated by
individual users. After aggregation, the central server obtain
a large sample space with random noises. As a result, one
may estimate the distribution from the noised sample space
by taking advantage of machine learning techniques such as
EM algorithm and regression analysis.
Under the above framework, a key observation can be made:
if features are mutual-independent, one can easily conclude
that the combinations of features from different candidate sets
are also mutual-independent. Therefore, when Bloom filters
of each attribute are mutual-independent (i.e., no collisions
for all bits), then the Cartesian product of Bloom filters of
different attributes are mutual-independent. In this sense, with
mutual-independent features of Bloom filters, existing machine
learning techniques like EM and Lasso regression are effective
for the multivariate distribution estimation. Some notations
used in this paper are listed in Table II.
2) Algorithmic Procedures of Local Transformation: Be-
fore describing the distribution estimation, we present that
details about the local transformation. In essence, local trans-
formation consists of three steps:
1) On each ith user, suppose we have an original data
recordX i = {xi1, x
i
2, . . . , x
i
d} with d attributes. For each
attribute Aj (j = 1, . . . , d) , we employ hash functions
Hj(·) to map x
i
j to a length-mj bit string s
i
j (called a
Bloom filter). That is,
sij = Hj(x
i
j) (∀j = 1, . . . , d)
2) Each bit sij [b] (b = 1, 2, . . . ,mj) in s
i
j is randomly
flipped into 0 or 1 according to the following rule:
sˆij [b] =


sij [b], with probability of 1− f
1, with probability of f/2
0, with probability of f/2
(5)
where f ∈ (0, 1) is a user-controlled flipping probability
that quantifies the level of randomness for local privacy.
3) Having flipped each bit string sij bit by bit into random-
ized Bloom filter sˆij (j = 1, . . . , d), we concatenates
sˆi1, . . . , sˆ
i
d to obtain a stochastic (d ·mj)-bit vector:[
sˆi1[1], . . . , sˆ
i
1[m1] sˆ
i
2[1], . . . , sˆ
i
2[m2] . . . sˆ
i
d[1], . . . , sˆ
i
d[md]
]
and send it to the server with guaranteed local privacy.
TABLE III: An example of census data X of college alumni
Age Gender Education Income Level
u1 29 M college working
u2 35 F master low-middle
u3 45 F college working
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
uN 49 M phd up-middle
TABLE IV: Attribute domain information of dataset X
j Aj Ωj |Ωj |
1 Age [25, 60] 35
2 Gender {M, F} 2
3 Education {college,master, phd} 3
4 Income {working, low-middle, up-middle, affluent} 4
TABLE V: Bloom strings of attribute domain Hj(Ωj)
j Aj Hj(Ωj) |Hj(Ωj)|
1 Age {100100111, . . . , 01010110} 35
2 Gender {01, 10} 2
3 Education {0101, 0110, 1100} 3
4 Income {0110, 0011, 1001, 1100} 4
TABLE VI: Privacy-preserving bit strings of X
Age Gender Education Income Level
u1 10010111 10 0111 0100
u2 01110001 00 1110 0111
u3 01011100 10 0100 0010
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
uN 11010100 00 0110 1111
Example 1:
Tabel III shows a simplified example of original cen-
sus dataset X with 4 attributes {“Age”,“Gender”, “Educa-
tion”, ”Income Level”}, where each record is contributed
by user ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Consider data record X
2 =
{35, F, Master, Low-middle} on 2nd user. To guarantee local
privacy, we first use hash functions Hj(·) to map jth element
of X2 into a bit string. Next, having been randomly flipped
bit by bit, these bit strings become
H1(35) = {01011001} ⇒ {10010111}
H2(F) = {10} ⇒ {00}
H3(master) = {0110} ⇒ {1110}
H4(low-middle) = {0011} ⇒ {0111}
where underlined bits have been changed according to Equa-
tion (5). Finally, the concatenation of these randomized bit
strings for each attribute yields a privacy-preserving bit string
for the entire record X2
[100101111011 00 1110 0111],
which will be sent to the central server under local privacy.
Similarly, other users should transform their data in a same
way. Table VI shows the example of transformed privacy-
preserving report strings received by the server. 
Parameters Setup: According to the characteristic of
Bloom filter [38], given the false positive probability p and
the number |Ωi| of elements to be inserted, the optimal length
mj of Bloom filter can be calculated as
mj =
ln(1/p)
(ln 2)2
|Ωj |. (6)
Furthermore, the optimal number hj of hash functions is
hj =
mj
|Ωj |
ln 2 =
ln(1/p)
(ln 2)
. (7)
So, the optimal h = ln(1/p)(ln 2) for all dimensions.
Privacy Analysis: Because local transformation is per-
formed by the individual user, no one can obtain the original
record X i, local privacy can be easily achieved and we only
have to analyze the privacy guarantee on the user side. Ac-
cording to the conclusion in [14], differential privacy obtained
for each attribute on the user side is 2h ln ((2− f)/f), where
h is the number of hash functions in the Bloom filter and f
is the probability that a bit vector was flipped.
Since both hash operations and randomized response on all
attributes are independent, then as pointed by the composition
theorem [31], the overall differential privacy achieved on the
user side should be
ǫ = 2dh ln ((2 − f)/f) , (8)
where d is the number of dimensions.
Overall, since the same transformation is done by all users
independently, this ǫ-local privacy guarantee is equivalent for
all distributed users. In the rest of our paper, we will focus on
how to achieve a better utility-privacy tradeoff from users’
privacy-preserving high-dimensional data with this privacy
guarantee ǫ.
Communication Overhead:
Theorem 1: The minimal communication cost C after the
local transformation is
C =
d∑
j=1
mj =
ln(1/p)
(ln 2)2
d∑
j=1
|Ωj |. (9)
Proof If we assume that the domain of each attribute
is publicly known by both users and the server, then the
communication cost of non-private collection is basically∑d
j=1 ln |Ωj |, which is related to the domain size. Nevertrhe-
less, in our method with local privacy, the communication cost
is
∑d
j=1mj , which is related to the length of Bloom filters
because only randomly flipped bit strings (not original data
record) are sent. 
For comparison, under the same condition, when RAP-
POR [14] is directly applied to the k-dimensional data,
all Ω1 × · · · × Ωk candidate value will be regarded as 1-
dimensional data, then the cost is
CRAPPOR =
ln(1/p)
(ln 2)2
k∏
j=1
|Ωj |, (10)
where
∏k
j=1 |Ωj | is due to the size of the candidate set
Ω1×· · ·×Ωk. Difference between Equation 9 and ?? is because
our LoPub, compared with straightforward RAPPOR, consid-
ers the mutual independency between multiple attributes. It
should be noted that the Bloom filter length mj as well as
communication cost CLoPub (or CRAPPOR) is independent
from the privacy level achieved.
C. Multivariate Distribution Estimation with Local Privacy
1) EM-based Distribution Estimation: After receiving ran-
domized bit strings, the central server can aggregate them
and estimate their joint distribution. However, the existing
EM-based estimation [16] for joint distribution estimation
is restricted to 2 dimensions, which is impractical to many
real-world datasets with high dimensions. Here, we propose
an alternative EM-based estimation that can applies to k-
dimensional dataset (2 ≤ k ≤ d) with provable complexity
analysis.
Before illustrating our algorithm, we first introduce the
following notations. Without loss of generality, we consider
k specified attributes as A1, A2, . . . , Ak and their index
collection C = {1, 2, ..., k}. For simplicity, the event Aj = ωj
or xj = ωj is abbreviated as ωj . For example, the prior
probability P (x1 = ω1, x2 = ω2, . . . , xk = ωk) can be
simplified into P (ω1ω2 . . . ωk) or P (ωC).
Algorithm 1 depicts our EM-based approach for estimating
k-dimensional joint distribution. More specifically, it consists
of the following five main steps.
Algorithm 1 EM-based k-dimensional Joint Distribution
Input: C : attribute indexes cluster, i.e., C = {1, 2, ..., k}
Aj : k-dimensional attributes (1 ≤ j ≤ k),
Ωj : domain of Aj (1 ≤ j ≤ k),
sˆij : observed Bloom filters (1 ≤ i ≤ N) (1 ≤ j ≤ k),
f : flipping probability,
δ : convergence accuracy.
Output: P (AC): joint distribution of k attributes specified by C.
1: initialize P0(ωC) = 1/(
∏
j∈C
|Ωj |).
2: for each i = 1, . . . , N do
3: for each j ∈ C do
4: compute P (sˆij |ωj) =
∏mj
b=1(
f
2
)sˆ
i
j [b](1− f
2
)1−sˆ
i
j [b].
5: end for
6: compute P (sˆiC |ωC) =
∏
j∈C
P (sˆij |ωj).
7: end for
8: initialize t = 0 /* number of iterations */
9: repeat
10: for each i = 1, . . . , N do
11: for each (ωC) ∈ Ω1 ×Ω2 × · · · × Ωk do
12: compute Pt(ωC |sˆ
i
C) =
Pt(ωC)·P (sˆ
i
C|ωC)∑
ωC
Pt(ωC)P (sˆ
i
C
|ωC)
13: end for
14: end for
15: set Pt+1(ωC) =
1
N
∑N
i=1 Pt(ωC |sˆ
i
C)
16: update t = t+ 1
17: until max
ωC
Pt(ωC)−max
ωC
Pt−1(ωC) ≤ δ.
18: return P (AC) = Pt(ωC)
1) Before executing EM procedures, we set an uniform
distribution P (ω1ω2 . . . ωk) = 1/(
k∏
j=1
|Ωj |) as the initial
prior probability.
Example 2: For simplicity, we consider the joint distri-
bution on attributes A2A3 (a.k.a. “Gender” and “Ed-
ucation”). First, we initialize the probability on each
combination as P (A2A3) = 1/(|Ω2| × |Ω3|) = 1/6.
2) According to Equation (5), each bit sij [b] will be changed
with probability f2 and remains unchanged with proba-
bility 1 − f2 . By comparing the bits Hj(ωj) with the
randomized bits, the conditional probability P (sˆij |ωj)
can be computed (see line 4 of Algorithm 1).
Example 3: We calculate the conditional probability
P (sˆij |ωj) of each attribute Aj (j = 2, 3). For example,
on attribute A3 (or Education), in the case of privacy
parameter f = 1/2, we have
P (sˆ13|A3 = college) (11)
=P (sˆ13 = 0111|H3 = 0101)
=P (sˆ13[1] = 0|H3[1] = 0)×
P (sˆ13[2] = 1|H3[2] = 1)×
P (sˆ13[3] = 1|H3[3] = 0)×
P (sˆ13[4] = 1|H3[4] = 1)
=(1−
f
2
)(1−
f
2
)(
f
2
)(1 −
f
2
) =
27
256
Similarly, the conditional probabilities on other combi-
nations can also be obtained.
3) Due to the independence between attributes (and their
Bloom filters), the joint conditional probability can be
easily calculated by combining each individual attribute,
so P (sˆi1sˆ
i
2 . . . sˆ
i
k|ω1ω2 . . . ωk) =
∏k
j=1 P (sˆ
i
j |ωj).
Example 4: The joint conditional probability
P (sˆ12sˆ
1
3|A2A3) of attributes A2A3 can be enumerated.
For example, the probability that u1 is “a female
(Gender=F) alumni with phd degree and low-middle
income” can be computed as
P (sˆ12sˆ
1
3|A2 = F, A3 = phd) (12)
=P (sˆ12|A2 = F)× P (sˆ
1
3|A3 = phd)
Similarly, the conditional probability P (sˆ12sˆ
1
3|A2A3) on
other 5 candidate combinations of A2A3 can be ob-
tained.
4) Given all the conditional distributions of one particular
combination of bit strings, their corresponding posterior
probability can be computed by the Bayes’ Theorem,
Pt(ω1ω2 . . . ωk|sˆ
i
1sˆ
i
2 . . . sˆ
i
k) (13)
=
Pt(ω1ω2 . . . ωk) · P (sˆ
i
1sˆ
i
2 . . . sˆ
i
k|ω1ω2 . . . ωk)∑
ω1
∑
ω2
· · ·
∑
ωk
Pt(ω1ω2 . . . ωk)P (sˆi1sˆ
i
2 . . . sˆ
i
k|ω1, ω2 . . . ωk)
.
Where Pt(ω1ω2 . . . ωk) is the k−dimensional joint prob-
ability at the tth iteration.
Example 5: Given the privacy-preserving bit string sˆ12sˆ
1
3,
the posterior probability P (A2A3|sˆ
1
2sˆ
1
3) at the first iter-
ation can be computed such as
P (A2 = F, A3 = phd|sˆ
1
2sˆ
1
3) (14)
=
P1(A2 = F, A3 = phd) · P (sˆ
1
2sˆ
1
3|A2 = F, A3 = phd)∑
ω2∈Ω2
∑
ω3∈Ω3
P1(ω2ω3) · P (sˆ12sˆ
1
3|ω2ω3)
Similarly, after observing the privacy-preserving bit
string 10 0111 0100 (Sˆ1), all posterior probabilities of
different combinations of A2A3 can be obtained.
5) After identifying posterior probability for each user, we
calculate the mean of the posterior probability from a
large number of users to update the prior probability.
The prior probability is used in another iteration to
compute the posterior probability in the next iteration.
The above EM-like procedures are executed iteratively
until convergence, i.e., the maximum difference between
two estimations is smaller than the specified threshold
maxPt(ω1ω2 . . . ωk)−maxPt−1(ω1ω2 . . . ωk) ≥ δ.
Example 6: For each observed privacy-preserving bit
string Sˆi (i = 1, 2, . . . , N), the posterior probability
P (A2 = F, A3 = phd|Sˆ
i) for each combination can
be obtained by the above procedures, Then, the prior
probability P (A2 = F, A3 = phd) is updated by
the mean value of N (here we take the 4 records
u1, u2, u3, and uN in the table) posterior probabilities
as
P1(A2 = F, A3 = phd) (15)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
P (A2 = F, A3 = phd, |Sˆ
i)
So, instead of initial probability P0(A2 = F, A3 =
phd) = 1/6 = 0.1667, the updated prior probabilities
P1(A2 = F, A3 = phd) (should be about 0.1564 in our
example) will be used in the next iteration. Similarly,
the initial probabilities of other 5 combinations will be
updated for the next iteration.
The above algorithm can converge to a good estimation
when the initial value is well chosen. EM-based k-dimensional
joint distribution estimation will also fail when converging to
local optimum. Especially when k increases, there will be
many local optimum to prevent good convergence because
sample space of all combinations in Ωj1 × Ωj2 × · · · × Ωjk
explodes exponentially.
Complexity: Before the analysis of complexity, we should
note that number of user records N needs to be sufficiently
large according to the analysis in [14], i.e., N ≫ vk, where
v denotes the average size of |Ωj |, otherwise it is difficult to
estimate reliably from a small sample space with low signal-
noise-ratio.
Theorem 2: Suppose that the average length of mj is
m and the average |Ωj | is v. Then, the time complexity of
Algorithm 1 is
O
(
Nkmvk + tNv2k
)
. (16)
Proof EM-based estimation will scan all N users’ bit
strings with the length of km one by one to compute the
conditional probability for vk different combinations, the time
complexity basically can be estimated as O(N(km)(vk)).
Also, in the tth iteration, computing the posterior probability
of each combination when observing each bit string will incur
the time complexity of O(tN(vk)2). As a consequence, the
overall time complexity is O
(
tNv2k +Nkmvk
)
. 
Theorem 3: The space complexity of Algorithm 1 is
O
(
Nkm+ 2Nvk
)
. (17)
Proof In Algorithm 1, the necessary storage includes N
users’ bit strings with the length of km, so it is O(Nkm). The
prior probabilities on k dimensions is O(vk). The conditional
probabilities and posterior probabilities on vk candidates for
all bit strings is O(2Nvk). So, the overall complexity is
O
(
Nkm + 2Nvk + vk
)
= O
(
Nkm + 2Nvk
)
since N is
the dominant variable. 
According to Theorem 2, the space overhead could be
daunting when either N or k is large. This makes the per-
formance of EM-based k-dimensional distribution estimation
degrade dramatically and not applicable to high dimensional
data.
D. Lasso-based Multivariate Distribution Estimation
To improve the efficiency of the k-dimensional joint dis-
tribution estimation, we present a Lasso regression-based
algorithm here. As mentioned in Section V-B1, the bit strings
are the representative features of the original report. After
randomized responses and flipping, a large number of samples
with various levels of noise will be generated by individual
users. So, one may consider that the central server receives a
large number of samples from specific distribution, however,
with random noise. In this sense, one may estimate the
distribution from the noised sample space by taking advantage
of linear regression ~y = Mβ, where M is predictor variables
and ~y is response variable, and β is the regression coefficient
vector. The determinism of Bloom filter can guarantee that the
features (predictor variables M) re-extracted at the server side
are the same as the user side. Moreover, response variable ~y
can be estimated from the randomized bit strings according to
the statistic characters of known f . Therefore, the only prob-
lem is to find a good solution to the linear regression ~y = Mβ.
Obviously, k-dimensional data may incur a output domain
Ω1× ...×Ωk with the size of |Ω1|× ...×|Ωk|, which increases
exponentially with k. With fixed N entries in the dataset X ,
the frequencies of many combination ω1ω2...ωk ∈ Ω1×...×Ωk
are rather small or even zero. So, M is actually sparse
and only part of the sparse but effective predictor variables
need to be chosen. Otherwise, the general linear regression
techniques will lead to overfitting problem. Fortunately, Lasso
regression [41] is effective to solve the sparse linear regression
by choosing predictor variables.
Algorithm 2 Lasso-based k-dimensional Joint Distribution
Input: C : attribute indexes cluster i.e., {1, 2, ..., k},
Aj : k-dimensional attributes (1 ≤ j ≤ k),
Ωj : domain of Aj (1 ≤ j ≤ k),
sˆij : observed Bloom filters (1 ≤ i ≤ N) (1 ≤ j ≤ k),
f : flipping probability.
Output:
P (AC): joint distribution of k attributes specified by C .
1: for each j ∈ C do
2: for each b = 1, 2, . . . ,mj do
3: compute yˆj [b] =
∑N
i=1 sˆ
i
j [b]
4: compute yj [b] = (yˆj [b]− fN/2)/(1 − f)
5: end for
6: set Hj(Ωj) = {Hj(ω) ∀ω ∈ Ωj}
7: end for
8: set ~y =
[
y1[1], . . . , y1[m1] y2[1], . . . , y2[m2] . . . yk[1], . . . , yk[mk]
]
9: set M =
[
H1(Ω1)×H2(Ω2) × · · · × Hk(Ωk)
]
10: compute ~β = Lasso regression(M, ~y)
11: return P (AC) = ~β/N
Our Lasso-based estimation is described in Algorithm 2 and
consists of the following four major steps.
1) After receiving all randomized Bloom filters from N
nodes, for each bit b in each attribute j, the central server
counts the number of 1′s as yˆj [b] =
∑N
i=1 sˆ
i
j[b].
Example 7: In Table VI, each bit is counted to obtain
the sum. With current 4 records, the count vector is
(2, 0 1, 4, 3, 1).
2) The true count sum of each bit yj [b] can be estimated
as yj [b] = (yˆj [b] − fN/2)/(1 − f) according to the
randomized response applied to the true count. These
count sums of all bits form a vector ~y with the length
of
∑k
j=1mj .
Example 8: With the count vector (2, 0 1, 4, 3, 1),
the true counts on each bit can be estimated as (2 −
0.5 ∗ 4/2)/(0.5) = 2, (0 − 0.5 ∗ 4/2)/0.5 = −2,
(1 − 0.5 ∗ 4/2)/0.5 = 0, (4 − 0.5 ∗ 4/2)/0.5 = 6, and
(3−0.5∗4/2)/0.5 = 4. Therefore, the true count vector
is (2,−2 0, 6, 4, 0).
3) To construct the features of the overall candidate set of
attribute ω1 . . . ωk, the Bloom filters on each dimension
Ωj is re-implemented by the server with the same hash
functions Hj() on the user end. Suppose all distinct
Bloom filters on Ωj are Hj(Ωj) = {Hj(ω) ∀ω ∈ Ωj},
where they are orthogonal with each other. The can-
didate set of Bloom filters is then M =
[
H1(Ω1) ×
H2(Ω2) × · · · × Hk(Ωk)
]
and the members in M are
still mutual orthogonal.
Example 9: By Cartesian product of multiple Bloom
filters of different individual attributes, the Bloom fil-
ters of all candidate attribute combinations can be
reconstructed. For example, the case that “a male
alumni with master degree and high-middle income”
can be represented by the concatenated Bloom filter
H2(M)H3(master) = 010110. Similarly, all |Ω2| ×
|Ω3| = 2∗3 = 6 candidate combinations can reconstruct
their corresponding Bloom filters as 010101, 010110,
011100, 100101, 100110, 101100. Therefore, the candi-
date matrix M can be represented as
M =


0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 0


(18)
Similar demonstration is also shown in Figure 4.
4) Fit a Lasso regression model to the counter vector ~y and
the candidate matrix M, and then choose the non-zero
coefficients as the corresponding frequencies of each
candidate string. By reshaping the coefficient vector into
a k-dimensional matrix by natural order and dividing
with N , we can get the k-dimensional joint distribution
estimation P (A1A2 . . . Ak). For example, in Figure. 4,
we fit a linear regression to y12 and the candidate matrix
M to estimate the joint distribution PA1A2 .
Example 10: Suppose ~β = [p11, p12, p13, p21, p22, p23]
represents the frequency of 6 combinations of A2 and
A3. Then, without noises caused by random flipping,
there should be the only ~β satisfying the linear equations
~β ·M = ~y, (19)
However, since ~y is an estimated vector with noises, ~β
cannot be directly solved. Therefore, linear regression
techniques can be used to capture the best ~β, which
includes the frequency entries for possible combinations
of A2 and A3. So ~β/N is the ratio of frequencies and
the estimated probability of P (A2A3).
Generally, the regression operation, the core of the esti-
mation, will lose accuracy only when there are many colli-
sions between Bloom filter strings. However, as mentioned
in Section V-B1, if there is no collision in the bit strings of
each single dimension, then there is no collision in conjuncted
bit strings of different dimensions. In fact, the probability
of collision in conjuncted bit strings will not increase with
dimensions. For example, suppose the collision rate of Bloom
filter in one dimension is p, then the collision rate will decrease
to pk when we connect bit strings of k dimensions together.
Therefore, we only need to choose proper m and h according
to Equation (6) and (7) to lower the collision probability for
each dimension and then we are guaranteed to have a proper
estimation for multiple dimensions.
Complexity: Compared with Algorithm 1, our Lasso-based
estimation can effectively reduce the time and space complex-
ity.
Theorem 4: The time complexity of Algorithm 2 is
O
(
v3k + kmv2k +Nkm
)
. (20)
Proof Algorithm 2 involves two parts: to compute the bit
counter vector, N bit strings with each length of km will be
summed up and this operation at most incurs the complexity
of O(Nkm); and Lasso regression with vk candidates (total
domain size) and km samples (the length of the bit counter
vector is km) has the complexity of O
(
(vk)3 + (vk)2(km)
)
.

Based on the general assumption that N dominates Equa-
tion (20), then we can see the complexity in Equation (20) is
much less than Equation (16) in Theorem 2.
Theorem 5: The space complexity of Algorithm 2 is
O
(
Nkm+ vkkm
)
. (21)
Proof In Algorithm 2, the storage overhead consists of three
parts: users’ bit strings O(Nkm), a count vector with size
O(km), and the candidate bit matrix M with size O(kmvk).
Therefore, the overall space complexity of our proposed Lasso
based estimation algorithm is O
(
Nkm + km + vkkm
)
=
O
(
Nkm+ vkkm
)
, which is also smaller than Equation (17)
as N is dominant. 
The empirical results are shown in Section VI. The effi-
ciency comes from the fact that the N bit strings of length
m will be scanned to count sum only once and then one-
time Lasso regression is fitted to estimate the distribution. In
addition, Lasso regression could extract the important (i.e.,
frequent) features with high probability, which fits well with
the sparsity of high-dimensional data.
1) Hybrid Algorithm: Recall that, with sufficient samples,
EM-based estimation could have good convergence but also
high complexity. Instead, Lasso-based estimation can be very
efficient with some estimation deviation compared with EM-
based algorithm. The high complexity of EM algorithm stems
from two parts: Firstly, it iteratively scans user’s reports and
builds a prior likely distribution table, which has the size of
N ·
∏
|Ωj |. And for each record of table, the computation has
to compare
∑
mj bits. However, when the dimension is high,
the combination of Ωj will be very sparse and has lots of zero
items. Secondly, Without prior knowledge, the initial value of
the random assignment (i.e., uniform distribution) will lead to
too many iterations for final convergence to occur.
To achieve a balance between the EM-based estimation and
Lasso-based estimation, we also propose a hybrid algorithm
Lasso+EM in Algorithm 3 that first eliminates the redundant
candidates and estimates the initial value with Lasso based
algorithm 2 and then refines the convergence using EM-based
algorithm 1. The hybrid algorithm has two advantages:
1) The sparse candidates will be selected out by the Lasso
based estimation algorithm, as shown in Steps 1,2,7,8
of Algorithm 3. So the EM algorithm can just compute
the conditional probability on these sparse candidates
instead of all candidates, which can greatly reduce both
time and space complexity.
2) Lasso-based algorithm can give a good initial estimation
of the joint distribution. Compared with using initial
values with random assignments, using the initial value
estimated with the Lasso-based algorithm can further
boost the convergence of the EM algorithm, which
is sensitive to the initial value especially when the
candidate space is sparse.
Theorem 6: The time complexity of Algorithm 3 is
O
(
(v3k + kmv2k +Nkm) + (tN(v′)2 +Nkm(v′))
)
, (22)
where v′ is the average size of sparse items in Ω1 × ...×Ωk,
and v′ < vk.
Proof See Theorem 2 and Theorem 4, the only difference
is that after the Lasso based estimation, only sparse items in
Ω1 × ...× Ωk are selected. 
Theorem 7: The space complexity of Algorithm 3 is
O
(
Nkm+ vkkm+ 2Nv′
)
. (23)
Proof See Theorem 3 and Theorem 5. 
Algorithm 3 Lasso+EM k-dimensional Joint Distribution
(Lasso+EM JD)
Input: Aj : k-dimensional attributes (1 ≤ j ≤ k),
Ωj : domain of Aj (1 ≤ j ≤ k),
sˆij : observed Bloom filters (1 ≤ i ≤ N) (1 ≤ j ≤ k),
f : flipping probability.
Output: P (A1A2 . . . Ak): k-dimensional joint distribution.
1: compute P0(ω1ω2 . . . ωk) = Lasso JD(Aj ,Ωj , {sˆ
i
j}
N
i=1, f)
2: set C′ = {x|x ∈ C, P0(x) = 0}.
3: for each i = 1, ...,N do
4: for each j = 1, ..., k do
5: compute P (sˆij |ωj) =
∏mj
b=1(
f
2
)sˆ
i
j [b](1− f
2
)1−sˆ
i
j [b].
6: end for
7: if ω1ω2 . . . ωk ∈ C
′ then
8: P (sˆi1sˆ
i
2 . . . sˆ
i
k
|ω1ω2 . . . ωk) = 0
9: else
10: compute P (sˆi1sˆ
i
2 . . . sˆ
i
k
|ω1ω2 . . . ωk) =
∏k
j=1 P (sˆ
i
j |ωj).
11: end if
12: end for
13: initialize t = 0 /* number of iterations */
14: repeat
15: ... ...
16: /* (similar to Algorithm 1) */
17: ... ...
18: until Pt(ω1ω2 . . . ωk) converges.
19: return P (A1A2 . . . Ak) = Pt(ω1ω2 . . . ωk)
Fig. 4: Illustration of Lasso-based Multivariate Joint Distribution Estimation
E. Dimension Reduction with Local Privacy
1) Dimension Reduction via 2-dimensional Joint Distribu-
tion Estimation: The key to reducing dimensionality in high-
dimensional dataset is to find the compact clusters, within
which all attributes are tightly correlated to or dependent on
each other. Inspired by [7], [46] but without extra privacy
budget on dimension reduction, our dimension reduction based
on locally once-for-all privacy-preserved data records consists
of the following three steps:
Algorithm 4 Dimension reduction with local privacy
Input: Aj : k-dimensional attributes (1 ≤ j ≤ k),
Ωj : domain of Aj (1 ≤ j ≤ k),
sˆij : observed Bloom filters (1 ≤ i ≤ N) (1 ≤ j ≤ k),
f : flipping probability,
φ : dependency degree
Output: C1, C2, ...,Cl: attribute indexes clusters
1: initialize Gd×d = 0.
2: for each j = 1, 2, . . . , d do
3: estimate P (Aj) by Lasso based Algorithm 2
4: end for
5: for each attribute m = 1, 2, . . . , d do
6: for each attribute n = m + 1, m+ 2, . . . , d do
7: estimate P (AmAn) by Lasso based Algorithm 2
8: compute Im,n =
∑
i∈Ωm
∑
i∈Ωn
pij ln
pij
pi·p·j
9: compute τm,n = min(|Ωm| − 1, |Ωn| − 1) ∗ φ2/2
10: if I(m,n) ≥ τmn then
11: set Gm,n = Gn,m = 1, G ∈ Gd×d
12: end if
13: end for
14: end for
15: build dependency graph with Gd×d
16: triangulate the dependency graph into a junction tree
17: split the junction tree into several cliques C1, C2, ...,Cl with elimination
algorithm.
18: return C = {C1, C2, ...,Cl}
1) Pairwise Correlation Computation. We use mutual
information to measure pairwise correlations between
attributes. The mutual information is calculated as
Im,n =
∑
i∈Ωm
∑
j∈Ωn
pij ln
pij
pi·p·j
(24)
where, Ωm and Ωn are the domains of attributes Am and
An, respectively. pi· and p·j represent the probability
that Am is the ith value in Ωm and the probability that
An is the jth value in Ωn, respectively. Then, pij is
their joint probability. Particulary, both pi· and p·j can
be learned from the direct RAPPOR scheme with Lasso
regression [14]. Their joint distribution pij then can be
efficiently obtained with our proposed multi-dimensional
marginal estimation algorithm in Section V-D.
Example 11: A 4 × 4 correlation matrix I can be built
for the example dataset of Table III to record the mutual
information measure.
I =


1.00 0.05 0.03 0.16
0.05 1.00 0.02 0.04
0.03 0.02 1.00 0.15
0.16 0.04 0.15 1.00

 (25)
where Im,n is the mutual information between Am and
An, e.g., I2,3 = 0.02 means the mutual information
between A2 and A3 is 0.02.
It should be noted that the correlations need to be learnt
between all attributes pairs in heterogeneous multi-
attribute data. That is to say the basic complexity is
O(d2), where d is the number. And in each learning
process, the complexity is decided by the distribution
estimation algorithm. So, the overall complexity is quite
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Fig. 5: Build junction tree from dependency graph
high if the distribution estimation has large complexity.
Therefore, the joint distribution estimation algorithm
must be light and efficient. In addition, to further
overcome the high complexity of pairwise correlation
learning when d is large, we also proposed a heuristic
pruning scheme, which can be referred to Section V-E2
2) Dependency Graph Construction. Based on mutual
information, the dependency graph between attributes
can be constructed as follows. First, an adjacent matrix
Gd×d is initialized with all 0. Then, all the attribute
pairs (Am, An) are chosen to compare their mutual
information with an threshold τm,n, which is defined
as
τm,n = min(|Ωm| − 1, |Ωn| − 1) ∗ φ
2/2 (26)
and φ (0 ≤ φ ≤ 1) is a flexible parameter determining
the desired correlation level. Gm,n and Gn,m are both
set to be 1 if and only if Im,n > τm,n.
Example 12: By comparing the correlation matrix I
with the dependency threshold τm,n, a dependency graph
represented by the adjacent matrix G can be built.
G4×4 =


1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
1 0 1 1

 (27)
3) Compact Clusters Building. By triangulation, the de-
pendency graph Gd×d can be transformed to a junction
tree, in which each node represents an attribute Aj .
Then, based on the junction tree algorithm, several
clusters C1, C2, . . . , Cl can be obtained as the compact
clusters of attributes, in which attributes are mutually
correlated. Hence, the whole attributes set can be divided
into several compact attribute clusters and the number
of dimensions can be effectively reduced.
Example 13: By triangulation, the dependency graph can
be transformed to a junction tree, in which nodes are
split into different clusters. Figure 5 demonstrates an
example of the junction tree built from the dependency
graph. The attribute set {A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6} is split
into 4 clusters A1A2, A2A3A5, A2A4A5 and A6, where
A2 and A2A5 is the separators and clusters A1A2,
A2A3A5, and A2A4A5 are also called cliques.
Complexity:
Theorem 8: The time complexity of Algorithm 4 is
O(d2(v6 + 2mv4 + 2Nm+ tN(v′)2 + 2Nm(v′))). (28)
Proof The core of the dimension reduction process is the(
d
2
)
times of 2-dimensional joint distribution estimation. The
complexity of each 2-dimensional joint distribution estimation
can be derived from Equation (22) when adopting the hybrid
algorithm (Algorithm 3). The complexity of building junction
tree on d× d dependency graph is negligible when compared
with the joint distribution estimation. 
Theorem 9: The space complexity of Algorithm 4 is
O(2Nm+ 2v2m+ 2Nv′). (29)
Proof When we compute the mutual correlations between
any pairs, a 2-dimensional joint distribution estimation algo-
rithm will be triggered with the space complexity ofO(2Nm+
2mv2+2Nv′), since k = 2 is substituted into Equation (23).
This maximum complexity dominates Algorithm 4. The space
complexity of building junction tree on d × d dependency
graph is negligible when compared with the joint distribution
estimation. 
2) Entropy based Pruning Scheme: In existing work [22],
[42] on homogeneous data, the correlations can be simply
captured by distance metrics. However, in our work, mutual
information is used to measure general correlations since het-
erogenous attributes (a.k.a., attributes with different domains)
are also considered.
As shown in Equation (24), to calculate the mutual infor-
mation of variables X and Y , the joint probability on the joint
combination is inevitable, thus making the pairwise computa-
tion of dependency necessary. Although mutual information
is already simple than Kendall rank coefficients in the similar
work [25], here, we still propose a pruning-based heuristic to
boost this pairwise correlation learning process.
Intuitively, there are different situations in Algorithm 4: 1.
When φ = 0 or φ = 1, all attributes will be considered
mutually correlated or independent. Thus, there is no need
to compute pairwise correlation. 2. With the increase of φ
(0 < φ < 1), less dependencies will be included in the adjacent
matrixGd×d of dependency graph, which will become sparser.
This also means that we may selectively neglect some pairs.
Inspired by the relationship between mutual information and
information entropy4, we first heuristically filter out some
portion of attributes Ax with least relative information en-
tropy RH(Ax) = H(Ax)/|Ωx|, and then verify the mutual
information among the remaining attributes, thus reducing the
pairwise computations.
Furthermore, the adjacent matrix Gd×d of dependency
graph varies in different datasets. For example, the adjacent
matrix Gd×d is rarely sparse in binary datasets but very sparse
in non-binary datasets. Based on this observation, we can
further simplify the calculation by finding the independency
in binary datasets or finding the dependency in non-binary
datasets. For example, we first set all entries of Gd×d for a
binary datasets as 1’s and start from the attributes with least
relative information entropy RH(Ax) = H(Ax)/|Ωx| to find
the uncorrelated attributes. While for non-binary datasets, we
first set Gd×d as 0’s and then start from the attributes with
largest average entropy to find the correlated attributes.
4The relationship between mutual information and information entropy can
be represented as I(X; Y ) = H(X) + H(Y ) − H(X, Y ), where H(X)
and H(X, Y ) denote the information entropy of variable X and their joint
entropy of X and Y , respectively.
Algorithm 5 Entropy based Pruning Scheme
Input: Aj : k-dimensional attributes (1 ≤ j ≤ k),
Ωj : domain of Aj (1 ≤ j ≤ k),
sˆij : observed Bloom filters (1 ≤ i ≤ N) (1 ≤ j ≤ k),
f : flipping probability,
φ : dependency degree
Output: Gd×d: adjacent matrix Gd×d of dependency graph of attributes
Aj (j = 1, 2, ..., d)
1: initialize Gd×d = 0
2: for each j = 1, 2, . . . , k do
3: compute P (Aj) = JD(Aj ,Ωj , {sˆij}
N
i=1, f)
4: compute RH(Aj) = −
1
|Ωj |
∑
p∈P (Aj)
p log p
5: end for
6: sort listA = {A1, A2, ...,Aj} according to entropy H(Aj)
7: pick up the previous ⌊length(listA) ∗ (1 − φ)⌋ items from listA as a
new list listA′
8: ...
9: compute pairwise mutual information among listA′ and set dependency
graph Gd×d as in Algorithm 4.
10: return Gd×d
F. Synthesizing New Dataset
For brevity, we first define AC = {Aj |j ∈ C} and XˆC =
{xj |j ∈ C}. Then the process of synthesizing the new dataset
via sampling is shown in the following Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6 New Dataset Synthesizing
Input: C : a collection of attribute index clusters C1, ...Cl,
Aj : k-dimensional attributes (1 ≤ j ≤ k),
Ωj : domain of Aj (1 ≤ j ≤ k),
sˆij : observed Bloom filters (1 ≤ i ≤ N) (1 ≤ j ≤ k),
f : flipping probability,
Output: Xˆ: Synthetic Dataset of X
1: initialize R = ∅
2: repeat
3: randomly choose an attribute index cluster C ∈ C
4: estimate joint distribution P (AC) by JD
5: sample XˆC according to P (AC)
6: C = C− C, R = R ∪ C, D = {D ∈ C|D ∩ R 6= ∅}
7: for each D ∈ D do
8: estimate joint distribution P (AD) by JD
9: obtain conditional distribution P (AD−R|AD∩R) from P (AD)
10: sample XˆD−R according to P (AD−R|AD∩R) and XˆD∩R
11: C = C−D, R = R ∪D, D = {D ∈ C|D ∩ R 6= ∅}
12: end for
13: until C = ∅
14: return Xˆ
We first initialize a set R to keep the sampled attribute
indexes. Then, we randomly choose an attribute index cluster
C to estimate the joint distribution and sample new data Xˆ in
the attributes Aj , ∀j ∈ C. Next, we remove C from the cluster
collection C into R, and find the connected component D of
C. In the connected component, each cluster D is traversed
and sampled as follows. first estimate the joint distribution on
the attributes AD by our proposed distribution estimations and
obtain the conditional distribution P (AD−R|AD∩R). Then,
sample XˆD−R according to this conditional distribution and
the sampled data XˆD∩R. After the traverse of D, the attributes
in the first connected components are sampled. Then randomly
choose cluster in the remaining C to sample the attributes
in the second connected components, until all clusters are
sampled. Finally, a new synthetic dataset Xˆ is generated
according to the estimated correlations and distributions in
origin dataset X .
Theorem 10: The time complexity of Algorithm 6 is
O(l(v3k + kmv2k +Nkm+ tN(v′)2 +Nkm(v′))), (30)
where l is the number of clusters after dimension reduction
and k here refers to average number of dimensions in these
clusters.
Proof The core of the dataset synthesizing is actually
multiple (l times) k-dimensional joint distribution estimation.

Theorem 11: The space complexity of Algorithm 6 is
O(Nkm+ vkkm+ 2Nv′ +Nd). (31)
Proof Every time, a k-dimensional joint distribution estima-
tion algorithm (with space complexity of O(Nkm+ vkkm+
2Nv′)) is processed to draw a new dataset. A new dataset with
the size O(Nd) is maintained while synthesizing. 
The overall process of LoPub can also be summarized
as in Figure 6. Clearly, all the processed are conducted on
the locally privacy-preserved data. Therefore, local privacy is
guaranteed on all the crowdsourced users.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we conducted extensive experiments on real
datasets to demonstrate the efficiency of our algorithms in
terms of computation time and accuracy.
We used three real-world datasets: Retail [1], Adult [5], and
TPC-E [2]. Retail is part of a retail market basket dataset.
Each record contains distinct items purchased in a shopping
visit. Adult is extracted from the 1994 US Census. This dataset
contains personal information, such as gender, salary, and
education level. TPC-E contains trade records of “Trade type”,
“Security”, “Security status” tables in the TPC-E benchmark.
It should be noted that some continuous domain were binned
in the pre-process for simplicity.
Datasets Type #. Records (N ) #. Attributes (d) Domain Size
Retail Binary 27,522 16 216
Adult Integer 45,222 15 252
TPC-E Mixed 40,000 24 277
All the experiments were run on a machine with Intel Core
i5-5200U CPU 2.20GHz and 8GB RAM, using Windows 7.
We simulated the crowdsourced environment as follows. First,
users read each data record individually and locally transform
it into privacy-preserving bit strings. Then, the crowdsourced
bit strings are gathered by the central server for synthesizing
and publishing the high-dimensional dataset.
LoPub can be realized by combining distribution estimations
and data synthesizing techniques. Thus, we implemented dif-
ferent LoPub realizations using Python 2.7 with the following
three strategies.
1) EM JD, the generalized EM-based multivariate joint
distribution estimation algorithm.
2) Lasso JD, our proposed Lasso-based multivariate joint
distribution estimation algorithm.
3) Lasso+EM JD, our proposed hybrid estimation algo-
rithm that uses the Lasso JD to filter out some can-
didates to reduce the complexity and replace the initial
value to boost the convergence of EM JD.
It is worth mentioning that we compared only the above
algorithms since our algorithm adopts a novel local privacy
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Fig. 6: Main procedures of high-dimensional data publishing with local privacy
paradigm on high-dimensional data. Other competitors are
either for non-local privacy or on low-dimension data.
For fair comparison, we randomly chose 100 combinations
of k attributes from d dimensional data. For simplicity, we
sampled5 50% data from dataset Retail and 10% data from
datasets Adult and TPC-E, respectively. The efficiency of our
algorithms is measured by computation time and accuracy.
The computation time includes CPU time and IO cost. Each
set of experiments is run 100 times, and the average running
time is reported. To measure accuracy, we used the distance
metrics AVD (average variant distance) on the three datasets,
as suggested in [7], to quantify the closeness between the esti-
mated joint distribution P (ω) and the origin joint distribution
Q(ω). The AVD error is defined as
DistAVD(P,Q) =
1
2
∑
ω∈Ω
|P (ω)−Q(ω)|. (32)
The default parameters are described as follows. In the
binary dataset Retail, the maximum number of bits and the
number of hash functions used in the bloom filter are m = 32
and h = 4, respectively. In the non-binary datasets Adult
and TPC-E, the maximum number of bits and the number
of hash functions used in bloom filter are m = 128 and
h = 4, respectively. The convergence gap is set as 0.001 for
fast convergence.
A. Multivariate Distribution Estimation
Here, we show the performance of our proposed distribution
estimations in terms of both efficiency and effectiveness.
The efficiency is measured by computation time, and the
effectiveness is measured by estimation accuracy.
1) Computation Time: We first evaluate the computation
time of EM JD, Lasso JD, and Lasso+EM JD for the k-
dimensional joint distribution estimation on three real datasets.
Figures 7 and 8 compare the computation time on the binary
dataset Retail with both k = 3 and k = 5. It can be noticed
that, for each dimension k, Lasso JD is consistently much
faster than EM JD and Lasso+EM JD, especially when k
is large. This is because EM JD has to repeatedly scan each
user’s bit string. Particularly, the time consumption of EM JD
increases with f because there will be more iterations for
the fixed convergence gap. In contrast, Lasso JD uses the
regression to estimate the joint distribution more efficiently.
5It should be noted that, with sampled data, the differential privacy level
can be further enhanced [28]. But sampling used here is for simplicity.
Furthermore, the complexity of Lasso+EM JD is much less
than EM JD as the initial estimation of Lasso JD can
greatly reduce the candidate attribute space and the number
of iterations needed. When k is growing, the computation
time of Lasso JD increases slowly, unlike EM JD that has
a dramatic increase. This is because the time complexity of
Lasso JD is mainly subject to the number of users.
Figures 9, 10, 11, and 12 depict the computation time on
non-binary datasets (Adult and TPC-E) when k = 2 and
k = 3. As we can see, EM JD runs with acceptable complex-
ity on low dimension k = 2. When k = 3, the time complexity
of EM JD increases sharply by several times. When k further
increases, it does not return any result within an unacceptable
time during our experiment. However, Lasso JD takes less
than a few seconds. This discrepancy is consistent with our
complexity analysis, where we envision that the exponential
growth of the candidate set will have a significant impact on
EM JD. So, with the initial estimation of Lasso JD, the
combined estimation Lasso+EM JD can run relatively faster
than EM JD with limited candidate set. The computation time
of EM JD and Lasso JD on TPC-E dataset with different
k = 2 and k = 3 exhibits a similar tendency, as shown in
Figures 11 and 12. We omitted the detailed report here due to
the space constraint. It should be noted that the general time
complexity on TPC-E is larger than Adult since the average
candidate domain of TPC-E is larger.
2) Accuracy: Next, we compare the estimation accuracy of
EM JD,Lasso JD, and Lasso+EM JD on real datasets.
Figures 13 and 14 report the AVD error of
EM JD,Lasso JD, and Lasso+EM JD on binary dataset
Retail with different dimensions k = 3 and k = 5. The AVD
error of EM JD is very small when f is small, but when f
grows, it will sharply increase to as high as 0.28. In contrast,
Lasso JD retains the error around 0.1 even when f = 0.9.
However, in practice, when f is small, i.e., f = 0.5, the
differential privacy an individual can achieve is ǫ = 8.79 for
each dimension, which is insufficient in general. So, when f
is large, the AVD error of Lasso JD is comparable to or even
better than that of EM JD. This is because Lasso regression
is insensitive to f when estimating the coefficients from the
aggregated bit sum vectors. Nonetheless, EM JD is sensitive
to f and prone to some local optimal value because it scans
each record of bit strings. In comparison, Lasso+EM JD
achieves a better tradeoff between Lasso JD and EM JD.
For example, it has less AVD error than Lasso JD when f is
small and outperforms EM JD when f is large. We can also
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Fig. 9: Estimation Time
(Adult, k = 2)
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Fig. 11: Estimation Time
(TPC-E, k = 2)
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Fig. 13: Estimation Accuracy
(Retail, k = 3)
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Fig. 14: Estimation Accuracy
(Retail, k = 5)
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Fig. 15: Estimation Accuracy
(Adult, k = 2)
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Fig. 16: Estimation Accuracy
(Adult, k = 3)
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Fig. 17: Estimation Accuracy
(TPC-E, k = 2)
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Fig. 18: Estimation Accuracy
(TPC-E, k = 3)
see that, the AVD error of all estimation algorithms increases
with k, since the average frequency on k−dimensional
combined attributes is N/vk and its statistical significance
decreases with k exponentially.
Figures 15, 16, 17 and 18 also compare the AVD error of
EM JD,Lasso JD, and Lasso+EM JD on the non-binary
datasets Adult and TPC-E with k = 2 and k = 3. As can
be seen, when k = 2, the AVD error of Lasso JD does not
change with f as the aggregated bit sum vector is insensitive
to small f . While EM JD increases with f gradually due to
the scan of each individual bit string. Similar to the conclusion
in the binary dataset, when f is large, the trend of Lasso JD
is very close to EM JD. Besides, Lasso+EM JD shows very
similar performance to EM JD and incurs relatively small
bias. Therefore, Lasso+EM JD achieves a good balance
between utility and efficiency as it runs much faster than the
baseline EM JD. In addition, when k increases (k = 3), the
estimation error increases as well. However, Lasso+EM D
can further balance between Lasso JD and EM JD because
the candidate set is much more sparse when k is larger and
Lasso+EM JD can effectively reduce the redundant of can-
didate set and iterations. Similar conclusion can be made from
the dataset TPC-E. Nonetheless, because of larger candidate
domain, the AVD error on TPC-E is generally larger than that
on Adult.
B. Correlation Identification
In this section, we present correlations between the multiple
attributes that we can learn from locally privacy-preserved
user data. Particularly, we evaluated loss ratio of dependency
relationship of attributes in three datasets. The parameters used
in the simulation are set as follows. The dependency threshold
0.25 for Retail, and 0.4 for Adult and TPC-E. The number
of bits and the number of hash functions in the bloom filter
are 32 and 4 for Retail, and 128 and 4 for Adult and TPC-E.
The sample rate is 1 for Retail and 0.1 for Adult and TPC-E.
1) Accuracy: Figures 19, 20, and 21 show both the ratio of
correct identification (accuracy), added (false positive) and lost
(true negative) correlated pairs after estimation, respectively.
From these figures, we can see all these estimation algorithms
can have a relatively accurate identification among the at-
tributes, especially EM JD and Lasso+EM JD algorithms.
Nevertheless, generally, the accurate rate decreases with f (i.e.,
privacy level). In Figure 19, the general accuracy identified rate
is about 85% when the privacy is small (f is less than 0.9).
While in Figures 20 and 21, the accuracy rate is as high as 95%
because the dependency threshold is relatively loose as 0.4.
High accurate identification guarantees the basic correlations
among attributes.
However, the incorrect identification is considered sepa-
TABLE VII: Dependency Loss Ratio and Complexity Reduc-
tion Ratio (Adult)
φ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
#. Dep (Pruning) 88 38 22 12 6
#. Dep 102 42 24 14 8
Loss Ratio 0.137 0.095 0.083 0.143 0.250
#. Pairs (Pruning) 91 66 55 36 28
#. Pairs 105 105 105 105 105
Reduction Ratio 0.133 0.371 0.476 0.657 0.733
TABLE VIII: Dependency Loss Ratio and Complexity Reduc-
tion Ratio (TPC-E)
φ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
#. Dep (Pruning) 44 16 16 8 8
#. Dep 46 24 20 10 10
Loss Ratio 0.043 0.333 0.200 0.200 0.200
#. Pairs (Pruning) 231 171 136 66 45
#. Pairs 276 276 276 276 276
Reduction Ratio 0.163 0.380 0.507 0.761 0.837
rately with false positive rate and true negative, which reflect
the efficiency and effectiveness of dimension reduction. Since
false positive identification just adds the correlations that were
not exists, this kind of misidentification only incurs no errors
but redundant correlations and extra distribution learning.
Instead, true negative identification implies the loss of some
correlations among attributes, thus causing information loss in
our dimension reduction. For false positive identification, we
can see that EM JD algorithm and Lasso+EM JD are less
than Lasso. That is because Lasso estimation will choose the
sparse probabilities and the mutual information estimated is
generally high due to the concentrated probability distribution.
Especially in non-binary datasets Adult and TPC-E, the spar-
sity is much higher, so the estimated probability distribution
is more concentrated and the false positive identification rate
is high.
The true negative identification in both Adult and TPC-E
is small because the true correlations are not very high itself
because all attributes have a large domain. Instead, the true
correlations in Retail are high and almost any two attributes
are dependent. Therefore, the true negative identification is
comparatively higher.
2) Effectiveness of Pruning Scheme: We also validated the
pruning scheme proposed in Section V-E2 with simulations on
the three datasets. We first defined the dependency loss ratio
as the ratio between the dependency loss after pruning with
the original number of dependencies in the adjacent matrix
Gd×d of dependency graph. The complexity reduction ratio is
defined as the ratio of reduced pairwise comparisons.
Tables VII, VIII, and IX illustrate the effectiveness of our
proposed heuristic pruning scheme. Particularly, as shown in
Tables VII and VIII, with the increase of φ, which shows
TABLE IX: Dependency Loss Ratio and Complexity Reduc-
tion Ratio (Retail)
φ 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
#. Dep (Pruning) 256 256 256 250 244
#. Dep 240 240 238 220 200
Loss Ratio −0.067 −0.067 −0.076 −0.136 −0.220
#. Pairs (Pruning) 91 91 78 66 55
#. Pairs 120 120 120 120 120
Reduction Ratio 0.242 0.242 0.350 0.450 0.512
the strength of correlations, the number of original depen-
dencies in dataset Adult decreases dramatically. Also, the
dependencies after the heuristic pruning decrease accordingly
and their number is quite close to the original. However,
when φ increases, the number of pairwise comparison becomes
less compared to the full pairwise comparison. So, it shows
that the heuristic pruning scheme can effectively reduce the
complexity with fairly small sacrifice of dependency accuracy.
Similar conclusion can be found in Table VIII on non-binary
dataset TPC-E. On the binary dataset Retail, due to the
prior knowledge that binary datasets normally have strong
mutual dependency, we changed the pruning scheme a little.
Particularly, we assume all the attributes are dependent with
each other and our pruning scheme aims at finding the non-
dependency from that attributes Aj with less entropy H(Aj).
According to Table IX, the number of dependencies after prun-
ing decreases slowly and the minus symbol in the dependency
loss ratio means that there is no loss of dependencies but there
are redundant dependencies that should not exist in original
datasets. It should be noted that redundant dependencies cover
all the original dependencies. Therefore, the redundancy will
not cause the degrade of data utility since more correlations are
kept. However, the efficiency of dimension reduction, which
should cut off as many unnecessary correlations as possible, is
hindered. So, according to Table IX, we can also say that the
heuristic pruning scheme can achieve up to 50% complexity
reduction without loss of dependencies.
C. SVM and Random Forest Classifications
To show the overall performance of LoPub, we evaluated
both the SVM and random forest classification error rate in the
new datasets synthesized by different versions of LoPub. We
first sampled from the three original datasets Retail, Adult, and
TPC-E to get both the training sets and test sets. Then, we
generated the privacy-preserving synthetic datasets from the
training data. Next, we trained three different SVM classifiers
and three random forest classifiers on the synthetic datasets.
Lastly, we evaluated the classification rate on the original
sampled test sets. Particularly, the average random forest
classification rate is computed on all the original attributes
and the average SVM classification rate is computed on all
the original binary-state attributes in each dataset, for example,
all attributes in binary dataset Retail, the 10th (gender) and
15th (marital) attribute in Adult, and the 2nd, 10th, 23rd, and
24th attribute in TPC-E. For comparison, we also trained
the corresponding SVM and random forest classifiers on each
sampled training set and measured their classification rate each
time.
Figures 22, 23, and 24 show the average accurate SVM
classification rate on three datasets Retail, Adult and TPC-E.
In all figures, the average SVM classification rate decreases
with f , which reflects the privacy level. Generally, when
f is small f < 0.9, the classification rate drops slowly.
Nevertheless, when f = 0.9, there will be a large gap. This
is because the differential privacy level changes as shown in
Equation (8). For SVM, the classification rate is relatively
close to the that of non-privacy case. This is because SVM
classification only considers binary-state attributes and the
distribution estimation on binary-state attributes can be more
accurate than non-binary attributes, which have sparser distri-
bution. In all figures, we can see that Lasso based estimation
has generally smaller classification rate because its biased
estimation. EM-based estimation generally outperforms others
but still showed performance degradation when f is large,
while Lasso+EM JD could find a better balance between
alternative methods.
However, in Figures 25, 26, and 27, due to the high sparsity
in the distribution of non-binary attributes, the joint distribu-
tion estimation on non-binary attributes may be biased and
that is why the random forest classification on our synthetic
datasets is not as good as SVM classification. Nonetheless,
the synthetic data still keeps sufficient information of original
crowdsourced datasets. For example, the worst random forest
classification rate in the three datasets is 67%, 42%, and 26%,
which are much larger than the average random guess rate
of 50%, 15%, and 13%, respectively. In detail, EM-based
estimation worked relatively well to generate the synthetic
datasets and Lasso estimation caused larger bias in the random
forest classification. However, with the initial estimation of
Lasso estimation, Lasso+EM JD works also well and de-
grades slowly with f .
For reference, the overall computational time for synthesiz-
ing new datasets are also presented in Figures 28, 29, and
30. Despite the worst utility, Lasso-based algorithm is the
most efficient solution, which achieves approximately three
orders of magnitudes faster than the EM-based method. As
mentioned before, that is because it can estimate the joint
distribution regardless of the number of bit strings. With the
initial estimation of Lasso JD, the EM JD can then be
effectively simplified from two aspects: the sparse candidates
can be limited and the initial value is well set. Instead, the
baseline EM JD not only needs to build prior probability
distribution for all candidates but also begins the convergence
with a randomness value.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel solution, LoPub, to
achieve the high-dimensional data release with local privacy
in crowdsourced systems. Specifically, LoPub learns from the
distributed data records to build the correlations and joint
distribution of attributes, synthesizing an approximate dataset
for privacy protection. To realise the effective multi-variate
distribution estimation, we proposed EM-based and Lasso-
based joint distribution estimation algorithms. The experiment
results on the real datasets show that LoPub is an efficient
and effective mechanism to release a high-dimensional dataset
while providing sufficient local privacy guarantee for crowd-
sourced users.
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